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/*
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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*
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*
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#include "config.h"
#include "SecurityOrigin.h"
#include "BlobURL.h"
#include "LegacySchemeRegistry.h"
#include "OriginAccessEntry.h"
#include "PublicSuffix.h"
#include "RuntimeApplicationChecks.h"
#include "SecurityPolicy.h"
#include "TextEncoding.h"
#include "ThreadableBlobRegistry.h"
#include <wtf/FileSystem.h>
#include <wtf/MainThread.h>
#include <wtf/NeverDestroyed.h>
#include <wtf/StdLibExtras.h>
#include <wtf/URL.h>
#include <wtf/text/StringBuilder.h>
namespace WebCore {
constexpr unsigned maximumURLSize = 0x04000000;
static bool schemeRequiresHost(const URL& url)
{
// We expect URLs with these schemes to have authority components. If the
// URL lacks an authority component, we get concerned and mark the origin
// as unique.
return url.protocolIsInHTTPFamily() || url.protocolIs("ftp");
}
bool SecurityOrigin::shouldIgnoreHost(const URL& url)
{
return url.protocolIsData() || url.protocolIsAbout() || protocolIsJavaScript(url) || url.protocolIs("file");
}
bool SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(const URL& url)
{
// FIXME: Blob URLs don't have inner URLs. Their form is "blob:<inner-origin>/<UUID>", so treating the part after "blob:" as a URL is incorrect.
if (url.protocolIsBlob())
return true;
UNUSED_PARAM(url);
return false;
}
// In general, extracting the inner URL varies by scheme. It just so happens
// that all the URL schemes we currently support that use inner URLs for their
// security origin can be parsed using this algorithm.
URL SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(const URL& url)
{
// FIXME: Update this callsite to use the innerURL member function when
// we finish implementing it.
return { URL(), decodeURLEscapeSequences(url.path()) };
}
static RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> getCachedOrigin(const URL& url)
{
if (url.protocolIsBlob())
return ThreadableBlobRegistry::getCachedOrigin(url);
return nullptr;
}
static bool shouldTreatAsUniqueOrigin(const URL& url)
{
if (!url.isValid())
return true;
// FIXME: Do we need to unwrap the URL further?
URL innerURL = SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url) ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url) : url;
// FIXME: Check whether innerURL is valid.
// For edge case URLs that were probably misparsed, make sure that the origin is unique.
// This is an additional safety net against bugs in URL parsing, and for network back-ends that parse URLs differently,
// and could misinterpret another component for hostname.
if (schemeRequiresHost(innerURL) && innerURL.host().isEmpty())
return true;
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsNoAccess(innerURL.protocol().toStringWithoutCopying()))
return true;
// This is the common case.
return false;
}
static bool isLoopbackIPAddress(StringView host)
{
// The IPv6 loopback address is 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1, which compresses to ::1.
if (host == "[::1]")
return true;
// Check to see if it's a valid IPv4 address that has the form 127.*.*.*.
if (!host.startsWith("127."))
return false;
size_t dotsFound = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < host.length(); ++i) {
if (host[i] == '.') {
dotsFound++;
continue;
}
if (!isASCIIDigit(host[i]))
return false;
}
return dotsFound == 3;
}
// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy (Editor's Draft, 17 November 2016)
static bool shouldTreatAsPotentiallyTrustworthy(const String& protocol, const String& host)
{
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsSecure(protocol))
return true;
if (SecurityOrigin::isLocalHostOrLoopbackIPAddress(host))
return true;
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(protocol))
return true;
return false;
}
bool shouldTreatAsPotentiallyTrustworthy(const URL& url)
{
return shouldTreatAsPotentiallyTrustworthy(url.protocol().toStringWithoutCopying(), url.host().toStringWithoutCopying());
}
SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const URL& url)
: m_data(SecurityOriginData::fromURL(url))
, m_isLocal(LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(m_data.protocol))
{
// document.domain starts as m_data.host, but can be set by the DOM.
m_domain = m_data.host;
if (m_data.port && WTF::isDefaultPortForProtocol(m_data.port.value(), m_data.protocol))
m_data.port = WTF::nullopt;
// By default, only local SecurityOrigins can load local resources.
m_canLoadLocalResources = isLocal();
if (m_canLoadLocalResources)
m_filePath = url.fileSystemPath(); // In case enforceFilePathSeparation() is called.
m_isPotentiallyTrustworthy = shouldTreatAsPotentiallyTrustworthy(url);
}
SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin()
: m_data { emptyString(), emptyString(), WTF::nullopt }
, m_domain { emptyString() }
, m_isUnique { true }
, m_isPotentiallyTrustworthy { true }
{
}
SecurityOrigin::SecurityOrigin(const SecurityOrigin* other)
: m_data { other->m_data.isolatedCopy() }
, m_domain { other->m_domain.isolatedCopy() }
, m_filePath { other->m_filePath.isolatedCopy() }
, m_isUnique { other->m_isUnique }
, m_universalAccess { other->m_universalAccess }
, m_domainWasSetInDOM { other->m_domainWasSetInDOM }
, m_canLoadLocalResources { other->m_canLoadLocalResources }
, m_storageBlockingPolicy { other->m_storageBlockingPolicy }
, m_enforcesFilePathSeparation { other->m_enforcesFilePathSeparation }
, m_needsStorageAccessFromFileURLsQuirk { other->m_needsStorageAccessFromFileURLsQuirk }
, m_isPotentiallyTrustworthy { other->m_isPotentiallyTrustworthy }
, m_isLocal { other->m_isLocal }
{
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::create(const URL& url)
{
if (RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> cachedOrigin = getCachedOrigin(url))
return cachedOrigin.releaseNonNull();
if (shouldTreatAsUniqueOrigin(url))
return adoptRef(*new SecurityOrigin);
if (shouldUseInnerURL(url))
return adoptRef(*new SecurityOrigin(extractInnerURL(url)));
return adoptRef(*new SecurityOrigin(url));
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createUnique()
{
Ref<SecurityOrigin> origin(adoptRef(*new SecurityOrigin));
ASSERT(origin.get().isUnique());
return origin;
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createNonLocalWithAllowedFilePath(const URL& url, const String& filePath)
{
ASSERT(!url.isLocalFile());
auto securityOrigin = SecurityOrigin::create(url);
securityOrigin->m_filePath = filePath;
return securityOrigin;
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::isolatedCopy() const
{
return adoptRef(*new SecurityOrigin(this));
}
void SecurityOrigin::setDomainFromDOM(const String& newDomain)
{
m_domainWasSetInDOM = true;
m_domain = newDomain.convertToASCIILowercase();
}
bool SecurityOrigin::isSecure(const URL& url)
{
// Invalid URLs are secure, as are URLs which have a secure protocol.
if (!url.isValid() || LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsSecure(url.protocol().toStringWithoutCopying()))
return true;
// URLs that wrap inner URLs are secure if those inner URLs are secure.
if (shouldUseInnerURL(url) && LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsSecure(extractInnerURL(url).protocol().toStringWithoutCopying()))
return true;
return false;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::canAccess(const SecurityOrigin& other) const
{
if (m_universalAccess)
return true;
if (this == &other)
return true;
if (isUnique() || other.isUnique())
return false;
// Here are two cases where we should permit access:
//
// 1) Neither document has set document.domain. In this case, we insist
// that the scheme, host, and port of the URLs match.
//
// 2) Both documents have set document.domain. In this case, we insist
// that the documents have set document.domain to the same value and
// that the scheme of the URLs match.
//
// This matches the behavior of Firefox 2 and Internet Explorer 6.
//
// Internet Explorer 7 and Opera 9 are more strict in that they require
// the port numbers to match when both pages have document.domain set.
//
// FIXME: Evaluate whether we can tighten this policy to require matched
// port numbers.
//
// Opera 9 allows access when only one page has set document.domain, but
// this is a security vulnerability.
bool canAccess = false;
if (m_data.protocol == other.m_data.protocol) {
if (!m_domainWasSetInDOM && !other.m_domainWasSetInDOM) {
if (m_data.host == other.m_data.host && m_data.port == other.m_data.port)
canAccess = true;
} else if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && other.m_domainWasSetInDOM) {
if (m_domain == other.m_domain)
canAccess = true;
}
}
if (canAccess && isLocal())
canAccess = passesFileCheck(other);
return canAccess;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::passesFileCheck(const SecurityOrigin& other) const
{
ASSERT(isLocal() && other.isLocal());
return !m_enforcesFilePathSeparation && !other.m_enforcesFilePathSeparation;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::canRequest(const URL& url) const
{
if (m_universalAccess)
return true;
if (getCachedOrigin(url) == this)
return true;
if (isUnique())
return false;
Ref<SecurityOrigin> targetOrigin(SecurityOrigin::create(url));
if (targetOrigin->isUnique())
return false;
// We call isSameSchemeHostPort here instead of canAccess because we want
// to ignore document.domain effects.
if (isSameSchemeHostPort(targetOrigin.get()))
return true;
if (SecurityPolicy::isAccessWhiteListed(this, &targetOrigin.get()))
return true;
return false;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::canReceiveDragData(const SecurityOrigin& dragInitiator) const
{
if (this == &dragInitiator)
return true;
return canAccess(dragInitiator);
}
// This is a hack to allow keep navigation to http/https feeds working. To remove this
// we need to introduce new API akin to registerURLSchemeAsLocal, that registers a
// protocols navigation policy.
// feed(|s|search): is considered a 'nesting' scheme by embedders that support it, so it can be
// local or remote depending on what is nested. Currently we just check if we are nesting
// http or https, otherwise we ignore the nesting for the purpose of a security check. We need
// a facility for registering nesting schemes, and some generalized logic for them.
// This function should be removed as an outcome of https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69196
static bool isFeedWithNestedProtocolInHTTPFamily(const URL& url)
{
const String& string = url.string();
if (!startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feed"))
return false;
return startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feed://")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feed:http:")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feed:https:")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feeds:http:")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feeds:https:")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feedsearch:http:")
|| startsWithLettersIgnoringASCIICase(string, "feedsearch:https:");
}
bool SecurityOrigin::canDisplay(const URL& url) const
{
ASSERT(!isInNetworkProcess());
if (m_universalAccess)
return true;
if (url.pathEnd() > maximumURLSize)
return false;
#if !PLATFORM(IOS_FAMILY)
if (m_data.protocol == "file" && url.isLocalFile() && !FileSystem::filesHaveSameVolume(m_filePath, url.fileSystemPath()))
return false;
#endif
if (isFeedWithNestedProtocolInHTTPFamily(url))
return true;
String protocol = url.protocol().toString();
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::canDisplayOnlyIfCanRequest(protocol))
return canRequest(url);
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(protocol))
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(m_data.protocol, protocol) || SecurityPolicy::isAccessToURLWhiteListed(this, url);
if (!SecurityPolicy::restrictAccessToLocal())
return true;
if (url.isLocalFile() && url.fileSystemPath() == m_filePath)
return true;
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldTreatURLSchemeAsLocal(protocol))
return canLoadLocalResources() || SecurityPolicy::isAccessToURLWhiteListed(this, url);
return true;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::canAccessStorage(const SecurityOrigin* topOrigin, ShouldAllowFromThirdParty shouldAllowFromThirdParty) const
{
if (isUnique())
return false;
if (isLocal() && !needsStorageAccessFromFileURLsQuirk() && !m_universalAccess && shouldAllowFromThirdParty != AlwaysAllowFromThirdParty)
return false;
if (m_storageBlockingPolicy == BlockAllStorage)
return false;
// FIXME: This check should be replaced with an ASSERT once we can guarantee that topOrigin is not null.
if (!topOrigin)
return true;
if (topOrigin->m_storageBlockingPolicy == BlockAllStorage)
return false;
if (shouldAllowFromThirdParty == AlwaysAllowFromThirdParty)
return true;
if (m_universalAccess)
return true;
if ((m_storageBlockingPolicy == BlockThirdPartyStorage || topOrigin->m_storageBlockingPolicy == BlockThirdPartyStorage) && !topOrigin->isSameOriginAs(*this))
return false;
return true;
}
SecurityOrigin::Policy SecurityOrigin::canShowNotifications() const
{
if (m_universalAccess)
return AlwaysAllow;
if (isUnique())
return AlwaysDeny;
return Ask;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::isSameOriginAs(const SecurityOrigin& other) const
{
if (this == &other)
return true;
if (isUnique() || other.isUnique())
return false;
return isSameSchemeHostPort(other);
}
bool SecurityOrigin::isMatchingRegistrableDomainSuffix(const String& domainSuffix, bool treatIPAddressAsDomain) const
{
if (domainSuffix.isEmpty())
return false;
auto ipAddressSetting = treatIPAddressAsDomain ? OriginAccessEntry::TreatIPAddressAsDomain : OriginAccessEntry::TreatIPAddressAsIPAddress;
OriginAccessEntry accessEntry { protocol(), domainSuffix, OriginAccessEntry::AllowSubdomains, ipAddressSetting };
if (!accessEntry.matchesOrigin(*this))
return false;
// Always return true if it is an exact match.
if (domainSuffix.length() == host().length())
return true;
#if ENABLE(PUBLIC_SUFFIX_LIST)
return !isPublicSuffix(domainSuffix);
#else
return true;
#endif
}
void SecurityOrigin::grantLoadLocalResources()
{
// Granting privileges to some, but not all, documents in a SecurityOrigin
// is a security hazard because the documents without the privilege can
// obtain the privilege by injecting script into the documents that have
// been granted the privilege.
m_canLoadLocalResources = true;
}
void SecurityOrigin::grantUniversalAccess()
{
m_universalAccess = true;
}
void SecurityOrigin::grantStorageAccessFromFileURLsQuirk()
{
m_needsStorageAccessFromFileURLsQuirk = true;
}
String SecurityOrigin::domainForCachePartition() const
{
if (m_storageBlockingPolicy != BlockThirdPartyStorage)
return emptyString();
if (isHTTPFamily())
return host();
if (LegacySchemeRegistry::shouldPartitionCacheForURLScheme(m_data.protocol))
return host();
return emptyString();
}
void SecurityOrigin::setEnforcesFilePathSeparation()
{
ASSERT(isLocal());
m_enforcesFilePathSeparation = true;
}
String SecurityOrigin::toString() const
{
if (isUnique())
return "null"_s;
if (m_data.protocol == "file" && m_enforcesFilePathSeparation)
return "null"_s;
return toRawString();
}
String SecurityOrigin::toRawString() const
{
return m_data.toString();
}
static inline bool areOriginsMatching(const SecurityOrigin& origin1, const SecurityOrigin& origin2)
{
ASSERT(&origin1 != &origin2);
if (origin1.isUnique() || origin2.isUnique())
return origin1.isUnique() == origin2.isUnique();
if (origin1.protocol() != origin2.protocol())
return false;
if (origin1.protocol() == "file")
return origin1.enforcesFilePathSeparation() == origin2.enforcesFilePathSeparation();
if (origin1.host() != origin2.host())
return false;
return origin1.port() == origin2.port();
}
// This function mimics the result of string comparison of serialized origins.
bool serializedOriginsMatch(const SecurityOrigin& origin1, const SecurityOrigin& origin2)
{
if (&origin1 == &origin2)
return true;
ASSERT(!areOriginsMatching(origin1, origin2) || (origin1.toString() == origin2.toString()));
return areOriginsMatching(origin1, origin2);
}
bool serializedOriginsMatch(const SecurityOrigin* origin1, const SecurityOrigin* origin2)
{
if (!origin1 || !origin2)
return origin1 == origin2;
return serializedOriginsMatch(*origin1, *origin2);
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::createFromString(const String& originString)
{
return SecurityOrigin::create(URL(URL(), originString));
}
Ref<SecurityOrigin> SecurityOrigin::create(const String& protocol, const String& host, Optional<uint16_t> port)
{
String decodedHost = decodeURLEscapeSequences(host);
auto origin = create(URL(URL(), protocol + "://" + host + "/"));
if (port && !WTF::isDefaultPortForProtocol(*port, protocol))
origin->m_data.port = port;
return origin;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::equal(const SecurityOrigin* other) const
{
if (other == this)
return true;
if (!isSameSchemeHostPort(*other))
return false;
if (m_domainWasSetInDOM != other->m_domainWasSetInDOM)
return false;
if (m_domainWasSetInDOM && m_domain != other->m_domain)
return false;
return true;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::isSameSchemeHostPort(const SecurityOrigin& other) const
{
if (m_data != other.m_data)
return false;
if (isLocal() && !passesFileCheck(other))
return false;
return true;
}
bool SecurityOrigin::isLocalHostOrLoopbackIPAddress(StringView host)
{
if (isLoopbackIPAddress(host))
return true;
// FIXME: Ensure that localhost resolves to the loopback address.
if (equalLettersIgnoringASCIICase(host, "localhost"))
return true;
return false;
}
} // namespace WebCore